The First Amendment: A Comparison of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Supreme Court Interpretations by De Jong, Norman
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 16 Number 1 Article 8 
November 1988 
The First Amendment: A Comparison of Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Century Supreme Court Interpretations 
Norman De Jong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
De Jong, Norman (1988) "The First Amendment: A Comparison of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century 
Supreme Court Interpretations," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16 : No. 1 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol16/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
The First Amendment: A Comparison of Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Century Supreme Court Interpretations 
NORMAN DE JONG 
Triniry Christian College 
In 1791, three scant years after the Constitution of the United 
States had been adopted, Congress approved and the several states 
ratified ten Amendments to that Constitution. The First Amendment 
read, in part: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof-, 
From these cryptic phrases, presumably understood and well-
intentioned by all those who voted for their adoption, has come 
monumental confusion. At the time this Amendment was passed, the 
United States was composed of thirteen states and slightly less than 
four million people. Today the U.S. population has mushroomed to 
some two hundred and twenty million people spread over fifty states. 
The situation to which this Amendment is supposed to apply has 
changed drastically in the almost two hundred years since its adoption. 
New states were carved out of the wilderness, new territories were ac-
quired, and waves of immigrants have landed on our shores. Through 
all of that change, however, the words of the First Amendment have 
remained fixed and absolute. No one has waged a prolonged effort to 
amend, abolish or alter it. 
To be an intellectual in America during the last half of the twen-
tieth century is tantamount to being cognizant of the church-state con-
troversy. It seems, moreover, that the United States Supreme Court 
has contributed to the confusion by interpretations since World War II 
which bear little resemblence to those decisions handed down in the 
first one hundred and sixty years of its existence. A comparison of 
those interpretations is the subject of this paper. 
In order to make any judgment as to which set of decisions is har-
monious with the original intent of the framers, it is necessary to ex-
amine the context in which the Constitution and its First Amendment 
were drafted. 
The Constitutional Context 
Without going into an exhaustive historical analysis, let me assert 
that it was not the Founding Fathers' intention to attempt the impossi-
ble separation of church and state. 1 When Congress and the thirteen 
states drafted the Constitution and then adopted the First Amend-
ment, they simply and clearly stated that "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof." 
It should be noted that Congress was thereby prevented from 
designating an established church, for that was to remain the 
prerogative of the separate states. The church-state patterns which 
were prevalent in Europe also found their way to America. When the 
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Revolutionary War broke out in 1776, nine of the thirteen colonies had 
established, state-supported churches. The Congregational church was 
officially established in the New England colonies of Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Elsewhere in the colonies the 
Anglican Church had become formally entrenched, with the govern-
ments of Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New York, South Carolina, 
and Virginia designating the Church of England as the established 
body.2 
In Virginia, the Anglican church had been established from the 
earliest days of the colony. In Maryland, though, the situation differed. 
Because of a rebellion involving some of the Catholic population in that 
colony, the Anglican church was made the official established church 
there in 1689. In Georgia and South Carolina the basic unit of colonial, 
and the later state, government was the parish. All the parishes, or 
congregational districts, were designated as the basic units of govern-
ment, with a specified number of church members elected from each 
parish to form the colonial assembly. When the Georgia state constitu-
tion was later adopted, this practice was continued with the stipulation 
that "the representatives shall be of the Protestant religion. " 3 
Unique among the thirteen colonies was Rhode Island, originally 
named Providence Plantation. Because of the intervention of the 
Puritan Commonwealth from 1642 to 1660, the people in Providence 
received little attention and encouragement from England. When 
Charles II was restored to the throne, however, new efforts were made 
to formally recognize and establish this group of dissenters as the col-
ony of Rhode Island. In 1663 Charles II issued a special charter in 
which he designated Benedict Arnold as Governor and named 12 
Assistants, one of whom was Roger Williams. 4 Recognizing that 
"some of the people and inhabitants-cannot-conforme to the publi-
que exercise of relision, according-to the Church of England," 
Charles II stipulated that it was his royal will "that all and everye per-
son-may freelye and fullye have and enjoye" his religious and civil 
liberties to the fullest. 5 
When the Continental Congress signed the Declaration of In-
dependence on July 4, 1776, each of the thirteen colonies became in-
dependent states. Since Virginia, South Carolina, and New Jersey had 
already made their separate proclamations, Congress put out a call re-
questing the remaining states to draft constitutions by which they 
could govern themselves. 
Pennsylvania was quick to respond, with its state convention 
assembled at Philadelphia on July 15, 1776. Expressing a great deal of 
respect for their political traditions, the constitutional delegates closely 
patterned their constitution after the charter of 1701, using almost 
identical language in many of the articles. By September 28 the docu-
ment was complete and ready for publication. 
The Continental Congress' call for state constitutions met with a 
different response in Connecticut. Instead of writing a new document, 
the General Court simply appended an introductory paragraph to the 
charter of 1662, in which they declared, 
That the ancient Form of Civil Government, contained 
in the Charter from Charles the Second, King of 
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England, and adopted by the People of this State, shall 
be and remain the Civil Constitution of this State. 6 
When the constitutional process was concluded, a majority of the 
states continued the tradition of established churches with which they 
had grown up. The divisions were as follows:7 
No Yes Until 
Rhode Island Georgia * * 
New Jersey South Carolina 1790 
Pennsylvania Virginia 1800 
North Carolina Maryland 1810 
Delaware New Hampshire 1817 
New York Connecticut 1818 
Massachusetts 1833 
In the European tradition , establishment of religion usually meant 
that one denomination was given special, privileged status and became 
the sole recipient of the state tax monies. Other religious affiliations 
were labelled as dissenters and were either tolerated or declared to be 
illegal. Potentially harsh treatments were well-known to many of the 
colonists, causing them to incorporate into their constitutions public 
statements guaranteeing religious toleration. 
Qualifications for Holding Office 
The newly independent states that emerged from the War of 
Revolution were thoroughly and almost exclusively Protestant. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the criteria for holding public 
office. After 1776, most of the states decreed that one had to be a 
member of the Protestant faith in order to be eligible for any govern-
ment position. Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, and South Carolina specified in their con-
stitutions that all office-holders must be of "the Protestant Religion." 
Pennsylvania, in spite of its reputation for toleration, ruled that each 
member of the legislature, before taking his seat, shall make and 
subscribe to the following declaration: 
I do believe in one God, the creator and governor of 
the universe, the rewarder of the good and the 
punisher of the wicked. And I do acknowledge the 
Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given 
by Divine inspiration. 8 
It was left to Delaware, however, to draft the most concise and most 
obviously Trinitarian criteria for their magistrates . Their constitution 
said that, 
Every person who shall be chosen a member of either 
house, or appointed to any office or place of trust, 
before taking his seat , or entering upon the execution 
of his office, shall take the following oath, or affirma-
tion, if conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, to 
wit: 
I, AB , will bear true allegiance to the Delaware State, 
submit to its constitution and laws, and do no act wit-
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tingly whereby the freedom thereof may be prejudiced. 
And also make and subscribe the following declara-
tion, to wit: 
I, A B, do profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus 
Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, 
blessed for evermore; and I do acknowledge the holy 
scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given 
by divine inspiration. 9 
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 
In June, 1783, before the peace treaty with Britain was signed, 
George Washington and Alexander Hamilton began making suggest-
ions to Congress concerning the governance of the Northwest Ter-
ritory, recently won from Britain. 
The Congress which met during the summer of 1787 was materially 
affected by the sessions of the Constitutional Convention. While the 
process of drafting the Constitution moved ahead in Philadelphia, such 
delegates as Madison and Washington maintained a keen interest in 
various bills as they worked their way to the floor of Congress for final 
vote. The "Ordinance for the Government of the United States, North-
west of the River Ohio" was a topic of particular interest, for 
Washington had actively promoted it and Madison had served on the 
committee which drafted it. Framed very closely on the model of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, the law passed through second and third 
readings with only minor revisions in wording. Finally, in early July, 
1787, the ordinance was taken up by the full Congress. 
Intended "for the prevention of crime and injuries, and for the ex-
ecution of process, criminal and civil,'' 10 the law required that all of the 
lands north and west of the Ohio River be surveyed and divided into 
townships of 36 square miles each, with each township assuming the 
basic governmental functions for the people residing in it. Article one 
guaranteed religious toleration, but the most far-reaching section, and 
the most often quoted, was the third article, which began, 
Religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to 
good government and the happiness of mankind, 
schools and the means of education shall forever be 
encouraged. 
Ten days after Congress legislatively approved the Northwest Or-
dinance, the members met again to vote on enabling legislation which 
would define the terms of sale, for offers of purchase had already been 
received from the Ohio Company. On July 23, 1787, Congress approved 
"Powers to the Board of Treasury to Contract for the Sale of Western 
Territory," in which they stipulated various responsibilities and con-
tractual obligations. Section 16 in each township was "to be given 
perpetually for the purposes contained in the said ordinance," defined 
there as being "religion, morality, and knowledge," the coterminous 
tasks of the school. Of equal importance was the requirement that sec-
tion 29 in each township must "be given perpetually for the purposes 
of religion," in order that churches might be established and pastors' 
salaries paid.11 
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Such was the environment in which the Constitution and its Ten 
Amendments were drafted. With a variety of religious persuasions and 
varying ethnic origins, the newly declared and victorious United States 
formed a heterogeneous mix that would create conflicts which would 
need resolution at the Supreme Court level. 
Nineteenth Century Court Decisions 
During the first decades of the nineteenth century , Connecticut was 
aflame with controversy and hostility between "democrats" and 
" federalists." The members of the Democratic-Republican party were 
followers of Jefferson and Madison, while the Federalists came from 
the tradition of Washington , Hamilton , and Adams. Although the 
Democrats had captured the presidency in 1800 and would retain it 
through the next three decades, the majority of voters in Connecticut 
continued their allegiance to the Federalists. 
The Dartmouth Case 
The controversy which had swirled through the country during the early 
1800's finally worked its way up to the United States Supreme Court. 
What was judiciously decided in 1819, though, had its roots in the 
original Connecticut Charter of 1662, which had been retained as the 
" new" Constitution of 1776. From the very beginning of its statutory 
existence, Connecticut had declared that its primary reason for ex-
istence was to "win and invite the Natives of the Country to the 
Knowledge and Obedience of the only true GOD, and the Savior of 
Mankind , and the Christian Faith. " 12 
Dartmouth College was originally founded by Rev. Eleazor 
Wheelock in 1751 as a means of implementing that missionary man-
date . Begun as an Indian Charity School in Lebanon, Connecticut , it 
was chartered by that colony's General Court and placed under its 
jurisdiction. In 1763, Rev. Wheelock petitioned the Assembly for 
funds to support his work and the more than twenty Indian youths who 
were studying to become misssionaries to their own people. The 
Assembly reacted favorably and promised to release tax funds for this 
purpose , as well as to recommend the cause to all of Connecticut's 
churches for their support. 13 
In 1770, New Hampshire took a special interest in 
Rev. Wheelock's program and enticed him to move his school to 
Hanover , New Hampshire. The governor offered a 3300 acre tract of 
land " freely given for the use of the college." In a letter of response 
dated August 23, 1770, Rev. Wheelock promised, 
I hope soon to be able to support by charity a large 
Number not only of Indian youths in Moor's charity 
school, which is connected and incorporated with the 
College, but also of English youths in the College, in 
order to their being fitted for missions among the 
Indians .14 
Rev. Wheelock had also received support from the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel, which was based in London, but that source 
of funds was cut off by the advent of the War. In 1778, Wheelock ap-
pealed for money from Congress and was granted $925.00 for ex-
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penses incurred in "supporting a number of Indian youths at his 
school. " 15 For a number of years thereafter, appropriations for Dart-
mouth College and Rev. Wheelock's Indian mission efforts were 
regularly approved by Congress. 
As the War of Revolution drew to a close, the program at Dart-
mouth attracted increasing attention. In 1781, the question was raised 
as to whether other students might enroll, but the answer was an em-
phatic "No," with the explanation that this school was reserved for 
evangelizing Indians and for training missionaries to the Indians. With 
its reputation spreading, monetary support increased. In 1789, the 
government of the state of Vermont made a generous donation of 
23,000 acres "of wild land," in "consideration of its contiguity to that 
State." The same year the state of New Hampshire made a grant of 
41,000 acres "of valuable land, adjoining the Connecticut River, near 
Hanover," and followed that in 1796 with another grant of 24,500 
acres. 
The historic Supreme Court case, known as Dartmouth v. Wood-
ward, had its immediate roots in a political squabble within the 
Legislature of New Hampshire, which had come under the political 
dominance of the Democratic-Republican Party. As part of a political 
power struggle with the Federalists, the Democrats tried to wrest 
control away from the existing Board of Dartmouth College and to 
change its direction. The Democratic governor, with the support of the 
legislature, appointed a new Board of Trustees for the college and 
disbanded the existing Board. The college, in defiance of the governor, 
continued to operate as a college without state funds while the case 
was slowly working its way through the lower courts. Meanwhile, the 
State Legislature loaned $4,000 to William Woodward, their newly ap-
pointed Treasurer of the College, to pay his legal expenses. 
When the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Marshall, finally 
handed down its 5-1 decision on February 2, 1819, it was clear that the 
Democrats had lost and that the old Board of Trustees had won. The 
Supreme Court ruled against Woodward and ordered him personally to 
pay a $20,000 indemnity to the college. The original charter, which had 
articulated the college's purpose of evangelizing Indians and training 
missionaries, was guaranteed. 
One of the clear implications of the Dartmouth decision was that 
charters and contracts were to be considered inviolate. The Supreme 
Court said, in effect, that the Constitution of the United States would 
protect the right of a college to consider its primary purpose that of 
propagating religion without interference from dissenting political or 
religious factions and that it had the right to receive state tax funds for 
such purposes. 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 
Based on the absence of litigation reaching the Supreme Court, it 
can be assumed that the period from 1819 to 1892 was relatively tran-
quil on matters of church-state relationships. Surveys by various 
reviewers indicate no church-state cases at the federal level between 
the Dartmouth decision and that involving the Church of the Holy 
Trinity, which was submitted on January 7, 1892 and decided on 
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February 29 of that same year. 
In response to high unemployment figures and excessive immigra-
tion pressures, Congress approved legislation on February 26, 1885 
"t o prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens 
under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its 
Territories, and the District of Columbia." "Any person, company, 
partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever," was forbid-
den to assist or encourage the importation or migration of any 
foreigner for purposes of working in this country. The language was 
broad and all-inclusive. 
Holy Trinity Church, however, needed a pastor. Rev. E. Walpole 
Warren, an alien residing in England, was selected as their preferred 
candidate, so a contract was issued in September, 1887. Mr. Warren 
accepted and moved to New York City to begin his duties. A complaint 
was filed, and Holy Trinity Church was not only charged with violating 
the 1885 act, but was also assessed a penalty prescribed by the act. 
The facts and procedures of the case were never in question, so the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled against 
the plaintiff. Holy Trinity appealed. The only question confronting the 
Supreme Court, therefore, was whether the District Court had erred in 
its conclusion. 
The decision of the Supreme Court was unanimous and resound-
ing. Yes, the court concluded, the acts of the church were within the 
terms and conditions of the law in question. The church had clearly 
violated the letter of the law, and pastors were definitely not in the 
specified exemption list. But, the Court concluded, "we cannot think 
Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in 
the present case." "Offenses against the United States, not offenses 
against the human race, were the crimes which the legislature intended 
by this law to punish." Furthermore, the thoughts expressed in this act 
were aimed only at the manual laboring class, and no one reading the 
law "would suppose that Congress had in its mind any purpose of stay-
ing the coming into this country of ministers of the gospel." 
After carefully and systematically dispensing with all the 
technicalities of the litigation, the Court got to the heart of the case. 
"Beyond all these matters," the opinion stated, "no purpose of action 
against religion can be imputed to any legislation, state or national, 
because this is a religious people. This is historically true. From the 
discovery of this continent to the present hour, there is a single voice 
making this affirmation." 
From that point to the conclusion, covering seven pages of detail 
and no less than twenty-six illustrations for evidence, the Court set out 
to prove "that this is a Christian nation." Quoting first from such co-
lonial charters as those granted to Virginia, Massachusetts, Connec-
ticut, and Pennsylvania, the Court worked its way up to the Declara-
tion of Independence, which "recognizes the presence of the Divine in 
human affairs in these words: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with Certain unalienable Rights.' 'We, therefore, the Representatives 
of the United States of America, (appeal) to the Supreme Judge of the 
world for the rectitude of our intentions.' (and express) 'a firm reliance 
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on the Protection of Divine Providence.'" 
Continuing its historical progression, the Court said, "If we ex-
amine the constitutions of the various states we find in them a constant 
recognition of religious obligations. Every constitution of every one of 
the forty-four states contains language which either directly or by clear 
implication " insists that " the happiness of a people and the good order 
and preservation of civil government essentially depend upon piety, 
religion and morality. These cannot be generally diffused through a 
community but by the institution of the public worship of God and of 
public instructions in piety, religion and morality." To hammer home 
its point, the opinion quoted sections from the state constitutions of Il-
linois (1809), Indiana (1816), Maryland (1867), Mississippi (1832), and 
Delaware (1776). 
Moving to the federal level, the Court asserted, "Even the Con-
stitution of the United States, which is supposed to have little touch 
upon the private life of the individual, contains in the First Amendment 
a declaration common to the constitutions of all the States, as follows; 
'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' 
In summing up all of the evidence to this point, the opinion went on 
to declare: "There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a 
universal language pervading them all, having one meaning: they af-
firm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These are not in-
dividual sayings, declarations of private persons: they are organic ut-
terances; they speak the voice of the entire people. While because of a 
general recognition of this truth the question has seldom been 
presented to the courts, yet we find that in Updegraph v. The Com-
monwealth, it was decided that, 'Christianity, general Christianity, is, 
and always has been a part of the common law."' 
Having argued from colonial charters, the Declaration of In-
dependence, various state constitutions, the U.S. Constitution, and 
sundry court decisions , the Supreme Court turned finally to a sweeping 
review of America 's laws, customs, and societal practices. Wherever 
we look, they said , "we find everywhere a clear recognition of the 
same truth . .. that this is a Christian nation ." In light of all that had 
been so forcefully presented , the judgment of the district court was 
reversed.17 
Subsequent Decisions 
The matter of church-state relations lay dormant for another seven 
years until the case known as Bradfield v. Roberts (175 U.S. 291) reached 
the Supreme Court in 1899. In that decision, the court upheld federal 
appropriations to a Catholic hospital in the District of Columbia. The 
majority decided that tax monies could constitutionally be ap-
propriated for ward construction and for the care of indigent patients, 
because the hospital performed "a public service". In 1908 the Quick 
Bear v. Leupp (210 U.S . 50) decision was handed down, with the Court 
upholding the federal disbursement of funds , held in trust for the Sioux 
Indians , to Catholic schools designated by the Sioux for payment of tui-
tion costs. Although the monies were intended for the benefit of the In-
dian students , the disbursements were made directly to the Catholic 
66 
schools for their use. In 1930 the court handed down still another deci-
sion which ruled in favor of religious establishments. In Cochran v. 
Louisiana Board of Education, the Court upheld Louisiana's purchase of 
textbooks for pupils attending all schools, including private and 
parochial ones. Reflecting a slight shift in public mentality, the 
Supreme Court upheld the practice as constitutional on the grounds 
that the benefits went to the children involved and not to the institu-
tions as such. 
Twentieth Century Turnarounds 
Since World War II, the courts in the United States have inter-
preted the First Amendment of the Constitution in ways that bear little 
resemblance to any of the decisions cited earlier. As we reflect briefly 
on them, we will need to address a major concern to the matter of inter-
pretation by the courts. We will need to ask whether the judges who 
make legal pronouncements are morally and ethically bound by legal 
precedent and whether they should rule on the basis of original intent 
(strict construction) or whether it is permissable to interpret on the 
ground of current sentiment. That, however, will be left for the reader 
to decide, based on the evidence. 
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case 
known as Everson v. Board of Education (330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504). The 
issue in the litigation was the practice of a New Jersey township 
whereby they reimbursed, from tax revenues, the cost of sending 
children "on regular busses operated by the public transportation 
system" to and from schools, including the private and parochial 
schools in that township. Everson, a municipal taxpayer, filed a formal 
complaint charging that payment for Catholic parochial students' 
transportation violated the establishment clause of the First Amend-
ment. The plaintiff argued that the early Americans "fervently wished 
to stamp out" all forms of religious establishment and "to preserve 
liberty for themselves and for their posterity''. 
If one read only Baptist histories or only the letters of Thomas J ef-
ferson, one could certainly arrive at such a conclusion. It should be ob-
vious, however, in the light of all the evidence submitted in the forego-
ing pages, that such a selective sampling of the extant literature would 
do a great disservice to the vast majority of early Americans and would 
grossly distort the meaning of the First Amendment. Yet Justice Hugo 
Black, writing the majority opinion in this watershed case, apparently 
was influenced significantly by the plaintiff's argument and limited 
himself almost exclusively to the perspective that was promulgated by 
Thomas Jefferson. In the majority opinion, Justice Black detailed the 
Virginia practice of paying tithes and taxes "to support government 
sponsored churches whose ministers preached inflammatory sermons 
designed to strengthen and consolidate the established faith by 
generating a burning hatred against dissenters" .18 The abhorrence of 
these practices, Black argued, ''reached its dramatic climax in Virginia 
in 1785-86" when "Madison wrote his great Memorial and 
Remonstrance" and "when the Virginia Assembly enacted the famous 
Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty." 19 
Black's majority opinion argued that "the 'establishment of 
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religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a 
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion 
over another ... No tax in any amount, large or small can be levied to 
support any religious activities or institutions ... Neither a state nor 
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the af-
fairs of any religious organizations or groups. In the words of Jeffer-
son, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to 
erect a wall of separation between church and State." 
Without citing precedent or case, Black went on to write, "This 
Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First 
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and J effer-
son played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended 
to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on 
religious liberty." Apparently impervious to the historical record, 
Black should have noted that Jefferson was in Europe throughout the 
period in question, serving as Ambassador to France, and had no direct 
involvement in drafting either the Constitution or the First Amendment. 
In 1952 the Supreme Court upheld a New York City released time 
program in which the religious classes were held in church buildings. 
Because the religion classes were held in church buildings and not on 
public school grounds, the court saw no significant danger in such prac-
tice. Yet, the Court was also quick to remind the nation that, "The 
First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should 
be separated (and) within the scope of its coverage permits no excep-
tion; the prohibition is absolute" . 20 On the heels of such a pronounce-
ment, in a curious and inconsistent rejoinder, the Court went on to add, 
"The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all 
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State ... Otherwise 
... municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire pro-
tection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into 
their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our 
legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the 
Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving a holiday; 
'so help me God' in our courtroom oaths-these and all other 
references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public 
rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment". 
In 1962, when the Court rejected the New York Board of Regents 
prayer in Engel v. Vitale, it was once again Justice Hugo Black who 
wrote the majority opinion. In concluding his argument, Black asserted 
that a "union of government and religion tends to destroy government 
and to degrade religion''. In making such a pronouncement, he not only 
contradicted what the Constitutional framers had repeatedly said 
about "religion, morality, and knowledge being essential to good 
government;" he also went well beyond what Madison and 
Washington had argued when they helped to formulate and enact the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Instead of following Jefferson's pattern 
consistently and placing his Deism on the pedestal of prominence, the 
Court, under the guidance of Justice Black, had entrenched a 
philosophy of an irreligious state and secular public school system. 
Since 1962 the church-state cases have become almost com-
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monplace on the Supreme Court agenda. The topics have included 
Bible-reading in public schools, posting of the Ten Commandments, 
use of university facilities by religious clubs, abortion, and the funding 
of Christian schools. The issues and the decisions are well known to 
many of us and will not be analyzed here. Suffice it to say that most of 
the decisions have served to build and reinforce the "wall of separa-
tion" which was not intended or envisioned by the framers of the Con-
stitution or the First Amendment. In the years since the Everson deci-
sion, a sacred-secular dichotomy has been imposed on the American 
republic, not because the Constitution demanded it, but because a 
myth was substituted for reality and was blessed by the judiciary. 
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